The US is not alone as a country that has experienced initiatives to deconstruct the administrative state. Interventions to politicize public services, especially in countries that are experiencing increasing political influence on bureaucracy and rising populism, have become common. Among the other countries associated with these initiatives are Brazil, Venezuela, Hungary, Poland and Turkey.   

Our concerns about recent attacks on the administrative state led us to pose a question relevant to recent developments around the globe: What does the evidence tell us about merit principles and government performance? We answered this question by conducting a systematic review, which adhered to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines. We prespecified the selection and quality criteria for inclusion of studies as a way to minimize bias. Our goal was to identify evidence from social science research about the effects of meritocracy, broadly defined, on government performance. The systematic review summarizes what high-quality empirical research tells us about effects of civil service practices, such as meritocratic appointments, meritocratic advancement, and tenure protection, for government performance and the quality of government.

The 96 articles in the systematic review provide consistent support for claims about meritocracy and government performance. Predictions based on traditional theories of meritocracy and government performance, as well as predictions grounded in principal-agent and quality of government theory, are affirmed by most results reported across a large number of studies. Although the research was diverse with respect to variables such as political context, administrative law, and organizational operations, the findings are similar regardless of context, suggesting the relationships between merit principles and government performance are robust.

The implications of the findings for Schedule F are unequivocal—converting career employees to Schedule F and removing their civil service protections is likely to degrade government performance. The outcome variables across the 96 articles are diverse, but outcomes likely to be affected range from unit performance, to citizen confidence, to corruption. 

The findings of the systematic review raise questions about some premises associated with Schedule F, which have been articulated by the executive order’s principal author, James Sherk. One premise involves the extent to which difficulty in removing a poor performer translates to agency performance. Although Sherk cites a modest stock of research about the effects of constraints on removing employees, these studies focus on small private firms in only three European countries. Does the body of evidence Sherk identifies apply to public institutional contexts for the types of policy and regulatory work performed by government employees? His premise should not be dismissed easily, but the evidence for the premise is neither robust nor broadly representative.

Another premise supporting Schedule F is that at-will employment policy is generally successful and, therefore, worth pursuing. Sherk cites several studies, which he asserts show mixed-to-positive effects. But the studies rely on small-sample cross-sectional survey data, typically from human resource directors in state government agencies. Although the studies generally agree that at-will employment increases responsiveness to political leadership, their authors are reluctant to make other claims about state-level at-will reforms. An appropriate conclusion from our systematic review and a recent meta-analysis of research about public job security is that tenure protection overall has a positive influence on government performance. What alternatives are available to policymakers seeking to alter institutional designs? One option would be to institute reforms to better manage tradeoffs between neutral competence, the central premise of traditional meritocracy, and responsive competence, which prioritizes responsiveness to political preferences. 

The systematic review results underscore the pressing need to reinforce the significance of neutrality and meritocracy among public officials. This message extends beyond the United States, reaching countries worldwide where bureaucratic meritocratic principles have weakened. This message compels policymakers, media outlets, citizens, and stakeholders everywhere to recognize the critical nature of these values in governance.

Are other tools available to effect performance management that reduce challenges created by poor performers? Two areas offer avenues for research and experimentation. The first is probationary periods. Several questions can be raised about the design and management of probationary periods, which are widely used in government: How effective are probationary periods for assessing an employee’s likely long-term work-related behaviors? What criteria should guide the length of probationary periods? To what extent are decisions to retain employees intentional and owned by their supervisors? Probation is a period during which most civil servants are at-will employees. We have almost no systematic evidence about the effectiveness of probationary periods. We also know relatively little about how agencies manage an employee’s conversion to career status. A 2015 US Government Accountability Office report that investigated federal performance management concluded that better use of probationary periods was one of three avenues to address poor performance. Probationary periods are an arena ripe for research and experimentation. The questions posed above represent a starting point for research and experimentation. Systematic evidence about the effectiveness of probationary periods would provide critical information for better performance management.

A second area that deserves future research and experimentation is the term for tenure protection. An appropriate conclusion from our study and other research about public job security is that tenure protection has a positive influence on government performance. Are there alternatives to mitigate concerns about poor performers who retain the benefits of tenure protection? Some governments have sought to modify employment contracts governing civil service, but, like practices surrounding probationary periods, we have relatively little systematic evidence about outcomes associated with modified employment contracts. Modestly changing traditional property-rights rules, for instance, might better assure a balance between job security and performance. Public employers might consider medium-term (5-15 year) employment contracts, which provide longer-term job security. The effects of medium-term contracts could be compared with at-will employment and short-term, 3-5 year, renewable contracts.

Policy Recommendations 

• The relationships between merit principles and government performance are robust.
• The systematic review results underscore the pressing need to reinforce the significance of neutrality and meritocracy among public officials.
• Converting career employees to Schedule F and removing their civil service protections is likely to degrade government performance.
• What alternatives are available to policymakers seeking to alter institutional designs? One option would be to institute reforms to better manage tradeoffs between neutral competence, the central premise of traditional meritocracy, and responsive competence, which prioritizes responsiveness to political preferences.

Implications for Practitioners 

• Are other tools available to effect performance management that reduce challenges created by poor performers? Two areas offer avenues for research and experimentation. The first is probationary periods. A second area that deserves future research and experimentation is the term for tenure protection.

Eloy Oliveira, Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin and a Brumley Senior Fellow at the Strauss Center for International Security and Law, USA. Gordon Abner is an Assistant Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, USA. Shinwoo Lee, Department of Public Administration, Incheon National University, South Korea. Kohei Suzuki is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Public Administration, the Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs at Leiden University, The Netherlands. Hyunkang Hur, Department of Public Administration and Health Management, School of Business, Indiana University Kokomo, USA. James L. Perry is a Distinguished Professor Emeritus and Chancellor’s Professor of Public and Environmental Affairs Emeritus, Paul H. O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA and Co-editor of the Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration.

The results of our research appear in Public Administration, which recently celebrated its 100th anniversary. The article is open access and can be accessed and downloaded at https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12945. The article is authored by Eloy Oliveira, Gordon Abner, Shinwoo Lee, Kohei Suzuki, Hyunkang Hur and James L. Perry.